Software Escrow in Bankruptcy: An International Perspective by Conley, John M. & Bryan, Robert M.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 10 | Number 3 Article 3
Summer 1985
Software Escrow in Bankruptcy: An International
Perspective
John M. Conley
Robert M. Bryan
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John M. Conley & Robert M. Bryan, Software Escrow in Bankruptcy: An International Perspective, 10 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 579
(1985).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol10/iss3/3
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
Software Escrow in Bankruptcy: An International
Perspective
John M. Conley*
Robert M. Byan**
I. Introduction
The large damage awards received by business computer users
in several recent cases' reflect the degree to which a business may
become dependent on its computer system. The computer system
may entirely control critical functions such as production, inventory
control, distribution, and payroll. For most businesses, the applica-
tions software2 that meets day-to-day business needs represents the
most important and most vulnerable component of the system.3 Be-
cause software, particularly custom-developed software, often re-
quires both regular maintenance and updating to meet changing
* Associate Professor, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law.
B.A. 1971, Harvard University; J.D. 1977, Ph.D. 1980, Duke University.
*0 Partner, Robinson, Bradshaw and Hinson, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina. B.A.
1972, J.D. 1976, University of Virginia.
I See, e.g., Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 684 F.2d 658, 663-64 (9th Cir. 1982)
($275,000 in compensatory damages.and over $2 million in punitive damages); cf. Com-
puter Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 740 F.2d 59, 62-63 (1st Cir. 1984) (almost $5 mil-
lion awarded to distributor of computer system in suit against manufacturer).
2 The term "hardware" is generally used to refer to computer machinery, while
"software" is used to refer to the encoded instructions or programs that control the opera-
tions of the hardware, together with data being stored on the computer. See generally
Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and Protection, 30 EMORY L.J. 483, 484-88 (1981). A
distinction is often drawn between operating or systems software and applications
software. Operating or systems software controls the basic functioning of the hardware
and makes the hardware generally available for the range of specific uses to which it may
be put. Applications software, interacting with the operating software, causes the com-
puter to carry out such specific tasks as printing a document, computing an average, or
doing a word search within a body of case law. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). In
lawyers' terminology, it would not be inaccurate to describe operating software as "proce-
dural" and applications software as "substantive."
3 See, e.g., Glovatorium, 684 F.2d at 661-62 (failure of computer system intended to
perform payroll and "routine accounting" functions); Dunn Appraisal Co. v. Honeywell
Information Sys., Inc., 687 F.2d 877, 879 (6th Cir. 1982) (failure of computer system in-
tended to manage auto appraisal business).
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business demands, the business customer may become dependent on
the software provider as well as on the software. 4 Thus, the user has
a vital interest in ensuring that someone will be able to perform the
maintenance and update functions if the software provider ceases to
do business.
The proprietor of a software package has another set of con-
cerns that sometimes conflict with those of the user. Most software
proprietors have a vital interest in protecting their research and de-
velopment investment by preventing others from misappropriating
their technology. One way to accomplish this is to distribute to users
only the materials necessary to run the software, while withholding
additional materials that might assist someone in copying or recreat-
ing it. Thus, users often receive less information than necessary to
take over the maintenance and update functions should the proprie-
tor go out of business.
"Source code escrow" is a label that applies to a variety of ar-
rangements designed to reconcile the conflicting interests of user
and proprietor. The purpose of such arrangements is to provide the
user with access to the material necessary to maintain and update the
software if the proprietor fails to do so, without significantly increas-
ing the risk of misappropriation of the software and the intellectual
property that it may embody. 5
This article deals with the major and still unresolved legal issue
that has arisen in connection with source code escrow arrangements:
whether the user can enforce the arrangements in the event of the
proprietor's bankruptcy. While it is impossible to be certain about
the enforceability of any escrow arrangement, whether domestic or
international, the prospects for enforcement are greatly enhanced if
the arrangement reflects an understanding of the underlying statu-
tory and policy issues.
I. The Domestic Perspective
A. The Problem
A written version of a computer program, whether printed on
paper or stored electronically on a disk or chip, is generally referred
to as code. There are two principal types of code: source code and
object code.6 Programmers typically write software in source code.
Source code is written in a high-level programming language that
4 See, e.g., Dunn Appraisal, 687 F.2d at 879 (reliance on vendor to convert purchaser's
business to new computer system); Napasco Int'l, Inc. v. Tymshare, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 654,
656-57 (E.D. La. 1983) (reliance on vendor to tailor "modular" computer system to cus-
tomer's needs).
5 See infra notes 6-17 and accompanying text.
6 See generally Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1243; Davidson, Protecting Computer Software:
A Comprehensive Analysis, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 339, 340-42 (1983).
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resembles English 7 and that another programmer readily can under-
stand. Object code is the version of the program that the computer
executes. Because it is encoded in machine readable language, ob-
ject code usually is difficult for a programmer to decipher. Compil-
ing is the process of translating a program written in source code
into object code that a machine can execute. A compiler, which is a
separate program, usually aids in this process.8 Decompilation, or
translation from object code back to source code, is a far more diffi-
cult process, but improvements in technology are making it easier.9
In most cases, the object code version is both sufficient and nec-
essary to run a particular program. For most users, however, exami-
nation of the object code reveals little about the nature of the
program; source code is necessary for this purpose. In particular,
access to source code is essential for the user to develop the under-
standing necessary to take over the maintenance and update func-
tions. Therefore, it is reasonable for a user whose business will
become dependent on a software package to insist on receiving the
software in both object code and source code from, or at least on
access to the source code if the proprietor defaults on its mainte-
nance and update obligations.
The reason many proprietors are unwilling to distribute source
code, however, is its utility in understanding how a program works.' 0
Access to source code can have tremendous practical value to one
who seeks to misappropriate a program. If the goal is to copy the
program," information derived from studying the source code can
7 FORTRAN, BASIC and PL I are examples of high-level programming languages.
See generally Davidson, supra note 6, at 341.
8 See id. at 341-42.
9 See id.; Laurie & Everett, Protection of Trade Secrets in Object Form Software: The Case for
Reverse Engineering, COMPUTER LAw., July, 1984, at 1-4.
10 A number of people commenting on the conference presentation of this article
pointed out that reluctance to distribute source code is a relatively recent development. In
the early days of the computer industry, software was often given away without any reten-
tion of intellectual property rights in an effort to promote hardware sales. In recent years,
however, as the cost of hardware has declined dramatically, enormous investments have
been made in software development. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587 n.7 (1977);
Brooks, Agreements with Consultants and Employees and Registering Copyrights in Computer
Software, in 1 COMPUTER LAw 1982: ACQUIRING COMPUTER GOODS AND SERVICES 9, 193-94
(P.L.I. 1982), and software has come to represent the bulk of the cost to the end user of a
computer system. SeeJ. SOMA, THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY 28-30 (1976). In recognition of
its economic value, software is now routinely distributed only pursuant to license agree-
ments that restrict the time, place, and manner of use. See, e.g., S&H Computer Sys., Inc. v.
SAS Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416, 420-21 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). As a result of the same
trend, few software vendors now regularly distribute their programs in source code form.
II A software author's protection against copying derives from the Copyright Act of
1976, as amended, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). Copyright protection subsists in "origi-
nal works of authorship," id. § 102(a), which have been held to include computer pro-
grams. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1240. The exclusive rights of the copyright holder
include the rights "to reproduce the copyrighted work" and "to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 106(l)-(2). For a general review of copy-
right protection of computer software, see Davidson, supra note 6, at 360-95.
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be useful in making simple, nonfunctional changes in the pirated
program to help disguise the copying. 12 If the plagiarist does not
intend to copy but rather intends to borrow ideas, concepts, and pro-
gramming methods for use in preparing a competing program, the
source code will be an invaluable reference material.' 3
Also, distribution of source code may have adverse legal conse-
quences for the proprietor. If the proprietor depends solely on
copyright for intellectual property protection, disclosure of source
code to customers and transfer of title in copies of the source or
object code will be legally immaterial. 14 The proprietor who seeks
trade secret protection for the software, either in addition to or in
lieu of copyright protection, however, must carefully control access
to source code.15 As a general rule, customers should gain access to
the code only pursuant to a license agreement that strictly limits use
and further disclosure of the code and the ideas and concepts it em-
bodies. 16 The sale or other transfer of title to copies of the code is
inconsistent with the retention of trade secret rights.' 7
Thus, a software proprietor may have a twofold incentive to re-
strict access to source code: uncontrolled access may create legal
problems for a proprietor who treats the software as a trade secret
12 Such conduct was alleged in SAS Institute, 568 F. Supp. at 423. Since a showing of
"substantial similarity" between the protected work and the accused work is the traditional
means of proving copyright infringement, enough superficial changes in a plagiarized
work may sometimes permit an otherwise culpable defendant to escape copyright liability.
See id. See generally 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.03 B, at 13-43 (1984 ed.).
13 Because copyright protection extends only to expression and not to underlying
ideas, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982), copyright law does not prohibit the type of appropriation
described in the text. A software proprietor concerned about the appropriation of ideas
and concepts may seek legal protection by distributing the software only pursuant to a
license agreement that forbids such conduct, and may create a practical barrier by refusing
to distribute the source code, which is a competing programmer's best guide to the struc-
ture and function of the protected software. See generally Davidson, supra note 6, at 395-
400.
14 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982) (lawful owner of copy of copyrighted work entitled to
sell or otherwise dispose of that copy without permission of copyright holder).
15 Perhaps the most widely cited definition of a trade secret is that set forth in com-
ment (b) to § 757 of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS. See 12 R. MILGRIM, TRADE
SECRETS § 2.01, at 2-3 n.2 (1983) and cases cited therein. According to comment (b), one
of the factors in determining whether a particular piece of information constitutes a trade
secret is "the extent of measures taken by the proprietor to guard the secrecy of the infor-
mation." Id.
16 See SAS Institute, 568 F. Supp. at 420-41; J&K Computer Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 642
P.2d 732, 735 (Utah 1982). But cf. Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 1984 Copyr. L. Dec.
(CCH) 25, 579 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 1984) (distinguishing J&K Computer and finding no
trade secret, because of unrestricted distribution).
17 Even if the code is subject to copyright protection, once title to a copy passes to a
third party, he or she is free to dispose of that copy at will. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (setting
forth the so-called "first sale doctrine"). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (right of disposal con-
ferred by subsection (a) does not accrue to possessor of copy who does not own it). Once
a copy thus has made an unrestricted entry into the stream of commerce, it is unlikely that
the proprietor any longer will be able to demonstrate that the secrecy of the code is being
adequately guarded. See supra note 15.
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and will facilitate plagiarism. "Software escrow" is the label given to
a variety of arrangements designed to reconcile the concerns of the
proprietor with the often conflicting, but equally legitimate concerns
of the user. Although the structural details may differ, these arrange-
ments have the common purpose of putting source code in the hands
of a reliable third party who will make it available to the user or the
user's designee only if the proprietor defaults on its maintenance or
update obligations.
From the user's perspective, an adequate escrow arrangement
must meet four criteria. First, the proprietor must deposit with the
third party source code and supporting documentation sufficient to
give the user or its designee a thorough understanding of the
software. Second, the proprietor must update the deposit whenever
changes are made in the software. Third, a technically competent
party must verify the adequacy of the proprietor's deposits. Finally,
there must be an immediate turnover of the deposited material to
the user or its designee if the proprietor defaults on its obligations
for any reason, including bankruptcy. From the proprietor's per-
spective, the principal goals are to insure the security of the depos-
ited materials, for both practical and legal reasons, and to avoid the
transfer of title to any copies of the code.
These arrangements regularly employ a number of options to
meet these needs.' 8 Some agreements call for a traditional escrow
agent, such as a bank or law firm, to hold a copy of the source code
and to release it upon proof by the user that the proprietor is in
bankruptcy or has otherwise ceased to do business. Other agree-
ments provide more elaborate definitions of the disability of the pro-
prietor and impose varying standards of proof on the user seeking
access to the code. Others call for the escrow agent to turn over the
code to a designee of the user approved in advance by the proprie-
tor, who will then perform the maintenance and update functions for
the user's benefit. There is a recent trend toward computer consult-
ing companies holding themselves out as professional escrow agents.
These companies advertise their ability to provide secure source
code storage, to verify that the proprietor is meeting its deposit obli-
gations, and ultimately to perform any maintenance and update work
required by the user.' 9
Despite their superficial differences, these arrangements share
the goal of providing source code access to the user if the proprietor
defaults on its maintenance and update obligations. The financial
demise of the proprietor is perhaps the most readily foreseeable
18 For a useful introduction to the practicalities of source code escrow, see Nycum,
Kenfield & Keenan, Debugging Software Escrow: Will It Work When You Need It?, 4 COMPUTER
L.J. 441, 443-47 (1984).
19 See id. at 447.
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cause of such a default. Therefore, any escrow arrangement should
provide that the necessary source code access will not be cut off by
the insolvency and subsequent bankruptcy of the proprietor, because
some provisions of American bankruptcy law threaten source code
access when the proprietor is in bankruptcy. 20
B. United States Bankruptcy Law
In a bankruptcy proceeding that contemplates the continued op-
eration of the debtor's business, 21 it is likely to be in the debtor's
interest to keep license agreements and related source code escrows
in place. If, however, the proceeding will liquidate the debtor 22 or
greatly reduce the scope of its business, the trustee's primary con-
cern will be to maximize the value of estate property, including intel-
lectual property. Source code that remains outside the estate will
reduce the value of any intellectual property being sold by the estate.
Under these circumstances, the trustee of a software proprietor may
have an incentive to reclaim any source code in the possession of
users, escrow agents, and other third parties.
Under the current United States Bankruptcy Code,23 the trustee
has three principal avenues to limit postbankruptcy source code ac-
cess. First, if the court deems the entire escrow arrangement to be
an executory contract, it may lie within the discretion of the trustee
to reject it and reclaim the escrowed code. 24 Second, if the court
deems the escrowed code to be property of the debtor's estate, 25 the
trustee may have the right to prohibit transfer of the source code or
to reclaim code that the debtor transferred after or immediately
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Third, the automatic
stay provision of the source code 26 may preclude efforts by the user
to gain access to the code after bankruptcy.
Each of these bankruptcy problems will be examined in detail.
For purposes of this discussion, assume that the user has received
object code pursuant to a license agreement, that the source code
has been placed in the hands of a third party pursuant to an escrow
contract that calls for user access if the proprietor defaults on its
maintenance and update obligations, and that the proprietor has be-
20 The potential impact of state insolvency laws on source code escrow is beyond the
scope of this article. Nonetheless, a lawyer structuring an escrow arrangement may wish to
review the insolvency laws of the state or states where the proprietor is located and the
escrowed code is held.
21 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1120 (1982).
22 See id. §§ 701-766.
23 Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-151104 (1982), as amended by the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
333 (1984).
24 11 U.S.C. § 365. See infra notes 28-52 and accompanying text.
25 11 U.S.C. §§ 541-543. See infra notes 53-80 and accompanying text.
26 11 U.S.C. § 362. See infra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
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come insolvent, has defaulted on its obligations, and is now in
bankruptcy.
1. Executory Contracts
Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code27 permits the bankruptcy
trustee28 to affirm or reject executory contracts previously entered
into by the bankrupt. The trustee may be able to reject an entire
contract even though certain discrete elements have been fully per-
formed.29 Some courts have permitted the trustee to reject contracts
in the exercise of reasonable business judgment,30 while others have
required a showing that performing the contract would impose an
undue burden on the estate. 3' Pursuant to section 365(b),3 2 if the
debtor is in default on its obligations under an executory contract at
the time of bankruptcy, the trustee cannot affirm and assume the ob-
ligations of the contract without a cure of the present default and
adequate assurances of future performance.33 Section 365(0 3 4 pro-
vides that when the trustee properly assumes the contract and gives
adequate assurances of future performance, he may assign the con-
tract regardless of any objection by the other party or any prohibi-
tion on assignment in the contract. Section 365(c) 3 5 creates the
27 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). The section does not define executory contracts. The defini-
tional question is discussed infra at notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
28 The role of the trustee is defined in 11 U.S.C. §§ 321-331.
29 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70(b), 30 Stat. 544, 566, repealed by Bankruptcy Act
of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-151326 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act of 1898] au-
thorized the trustee to reject contracts that were "executory in whole or in part." This
language was generally interpreted as permitting rejection of an entire contract as execu-
tory regardless of partial performance or performance of severable parts. See, e.g., In re
Universal Medical Serv., 325 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (contract for delivery and in-
stallment of floor rejected in entirety even though delivery complete before bankruptcy).
Section 365 of the current Code generally preserves intact the trustee's power to re-
ject under former § 70b. It does not, however, contain the "in whole or in part" language
of the former section. Nonetheless, there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest
that this omission was intended to reduce the trustee's power, and the prudent operating
assumption is therefore that the trustee retains the power to reject an entire executory
contract, even if performance is partially complete. See In re Meadows, 39 Bankr. 538, 540
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984) ("Case law demonstrates that a trustee cannot accept part of an
unseverable executory contract and reject that portion of no benefit to the estate."). For
pertinent portions of the legislative history, see S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
58-60 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5844.
30 See, e.g., Control Data Corp. v. Zelman, 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979).
31 See In re Lafayette Radio Elec. Corp., 8 Bankr. 528, 533 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
32 11 U.S.C. § 365(b).
33 Id. Note that the provisions of § 365(b) do not apply to "defaults" that are de-
fined, expressly or by implication, in terms of the bankruptcy, insolvency, or financial con-
dition of the debtor. Id. § 365(b)(2). This provision is a manifestation of a general Code
policy against so-called ipso facto contractual clauses that purport to condition particular
events on the financial condition of the debtor. See In re Garnas, 38 Bankr. 221, 223
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1984) (prohibiting termination of executory insurance contract because of
insolvency of insured). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (c) (invalidating transfers of property of estate
conditioned on financial condition of debtor).
34 11 U.S.C. § 362(0.
35 Id. § 365(c).
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single exception to this general rule. Pursuant to section 365(c), the
trustee must have the consent of the other party to assume or assign
an executory contract if nonbankruptcy law would excuse the other
party from rendering performance to or accepting performance from
a third party, as in a contract for personal services. 36
The ramifications of section 365 for software escrow are obvi-
ous. If the court deems the escrow arrangement to be an executory
contract as of the time of bankruptcy, the trustee may able to reject
it.37 If the trustee rejects the contract, he will be in a position to
reclaim source code in the hands of the user or a third party, denying
the user further access to the code.38 Moreover, if the court deems
the contract executory, the trustee may have difficulty in assuming it
even if inclined to do so; conversely, if the trustee does assume, he
may be in a position to make an assignment that is unsatisfactory to
the user.39
The critical question, of course, is whether the court will deem
the escrow arrangement to be an executory contract. The Code pro-
vides no definition of the term. Many courts have adopted the defini-
tion proposed by Professor Vern Countryman in an influential 1973
article: "a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt
36 See, e.g., In re Harms, 10 Bankr. 817, 821 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) (limited partner-
ship is personal contract under Colorado law and thus within § 365(c) exception). As a
practical matter, courts are often reluctant to find that a contract is within the section even
when the nonbankrupt party logically can argue that it was relying on the skill and exper-
tise of the bankrupt party. See, e.g., In re Varisco, 16 Bankr. 634, 638 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1981) (franchise agreement assumable because not "merely a personal service contract
based on special trust and a special relationship of the parties").
37 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). As should be obvious, the underlying license pursuant to
which the user has been furnished the object code is in similar jeopardy. In fact, each of
theories available to attack a source code escrow arrangement is equally applicable to the
object code license. If this license is successfully rejected by the trustee, the entire source
code escrow question will be moot, because the user will have no need to update software
that it no longer can use. For practical suggestions for improving the prospects for sur-
vival of both the object code license and the source code escrow in the event of the propri-
etor's bankruptcy, see infra text accompanying notes 96-106.
38 If the escrow agreement is successfully rejected, the user will have no further rights
in the escrowed code, and it will revert to the trustee as property of the estate. See infra
notes 53-80 and accompanying text.
39 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (trustee may not assume executory contract in default with-
out cure and adequate future assurances); § 365(0 (trustee has broad rights to assign exec-
utory contracts notwithstanding nonassignment provisions). The trustee's power of
assignment does not apply to contracts covered by § 365(c). See id. § 365(f); supra note 36.
As a practical matter, in a reorganization proceeding under chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, II U.S.C. §§ 1101-1120, it is likely to be in the debtor's interest to keep
license agreements and related escrows in place, if § 365(c) can be satisfied. In a liquida-
tion under Chapter 7 of the Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766, however, the trustee's primary
concern will be to maximize the present value of the property of the estate, including
intellectual property. To the extent that source code is allowed to remain in the hands of
third parties, the value of software being sold in connection with the liquidation may be
reduced. A software licensor's trustee who is liquidating the licensor's estate will therefore
have an incentive to reject outstanding licenses and reclaim any source code in the posses-
sion of third parties.
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and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the
failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material
breach excusing the performance of the other."'40 Courts purporting
to follow Countryman's bilateral obligation test have reached results
that sometimes seem to exalt form over substance. Courts have
held, for example, that an exclusive technology license is executory
because of the ongoing duty of the licensor to forebear from licens-
ing to others, 4 1 but that a nonexclusive license is not executory, be-
cause of the absence of any such continuing obligation on the part of
the licensor.42 Similarly, a court has also held that an option on real
estate given by the debtors is executory because of the optionors'
continuing duty to forebear from selling to others.43
Other courts have adopted other standards, leading to further
confusion on the question of the definition of an executory contract.
The courts in the Fifth Circuit, for example, have required only that
"something remains to be done by one or more of the parties. ' 44
Under this standard, courts have held resort time-sharing agree-
ments to be executory. 45 The Tenth Circuit has required "complex"
continuing duties on both sides.46 One bankruptcy court has fol-
lowed this standard, concluding that a limited partnership is execu-
tory, even though the limited partners' only further obligation is to
furnish money. 47
If the trustee seeks to reject an escrow arrangement as execu-
tory, his success will depend substantially on the court's definition of
executory contract. If the court defines the term expansively, the
trustee may have to do nothing more than cite the continuing obliga-
tions of the nonbankrupt parties (the user and the escrow agent) to
comply with the terms of the escrow.48 Even if the court applies the
bilateral obligation test, the trustee may prevail by demonstrating
that the debtor has some minimal continuing duty, such as a duty to
update the deposit. 49
The trustee's apparently broad authority to reject executory
contracts, however, must be viewed in light of some important policy
40 Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460
(1973). See 2 L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 365.02 (15th ed. 1980). The legislative
history emphasizes the necessity of mutual unfulfilled obligations. See S. REP. No. 95-989,
supra note 29, at 58, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5844.
41 In re Select-A-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d 290, 292-93 (9th Cir. 1980).
42 In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 38 Bankr. 341 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984).
43 In re Waldron, 36 Bankr. 633 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
44 Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. American Magnesium Co., 488 F.2d 147, 152 (5th Cir.
1974).
45 In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc., 18 Bankr. 612, 616-17 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
46 Workman v. Harrison, 282 F.2d 693, 699 (10th Cir. 1960).
47 In re Harms, 10 Bankr. 817, 820 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981).
48 Such a result might be reached under the Fifth Circuit test, for example. See supra
notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
49 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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considerations. The policy expressed in the statute and the cases is
that the trustee should be able to avoid contracts that impose an
ongoing and undue burden on the estate. 50 Rejection is inappropri-
ate, however, where it merely deprives the other party of some fully
earned benefit: "Section 365 . . . reflects a number of policies, in-
cluding not only benefit to the estate but also protection of credi-
tors."''S  Accordingly, if the debtor-proprietor's postbankruptcy
duties are minimal, a strong policy argument can be made that pro-
tection of the user should be the court's primary concern. 52
2. Property of the Estate
Section 541 (a) (1) of the Code defines "property of the estate" to
include "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case." s53 Pursuant to section 541(c)(1),
property of the debtor becomes property of the estate notwithstand-
ing a "spendthrift" provision that purports to restrict transfer of the
debtor's interest54 or any provision that purports to transfer the
property to a third party on the insolvency or bankruptcy of the
debtor.55 Section 542(a) requires that any entity in possession, cus-
tody, or control of property of the estate during the pendency of the
bankruptcy case turn it over to the trustee. 56 Pursuant to section
543, one who has possession of property of the estate as a custodian
must take appropriate steps to preserve the property and turn it over
to the trustee and account for it.5 7 Finally, section 549 permits the
trustee to avoid any transfer of property of the estate that takes place
after commencement of the bankruptcy case. 58
50 See, e.g., Select-A-Seat, 625 F.2d at 293.
51 In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 55 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). See also In re Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc., 38 Bankr. 341 (E.D. Va. 1984) (citing equitable considerations in finding
that technology license not an executory contract); In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., 35
Bankr. 561 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983) (technology license is executory, but cannot be re-
jected because of disproportionate harm to nonbankrupt licensee). In the license area, the
policy established under § 70b of the former Bankruptcy Act (the predecessor to present
§ 365) was that licenses could not be rejected even if there were continuing obligations on
both sides, "probably because of a 'judicially created policy of protection and encourage-
ment of creative genius.' " In re Booth, 19 Bankr. at 57 n.6 (citations omitted).
52 See infra text accompanying notes 96-106 for drafting suggestions to limit the obli-
gations of the debtor-proprietor and thereby enhance the prospects for enforcement of
the escrow arrangement.
53 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Property of the estate includes property "wherever located
and by whomever held." Id.
54 Id. § 541(c)(1)(A).
55 Id. § 541(c)(1)(B).
56 Id. § 542(a).
57 Id. § 543(a) (custodian with knowledge of commencement of bankruptcy case can
take only such action with respect to estate property as is necessary to preserve it);
§ 543(b) (custodian shall deliver estate property to trustee and file accounting).
58 Id. § 549(a). Pursuant to § 549(b), in an involuntary bankruptcy, a transfer occur-
ring after the commencement of the case is valid to the extent of any new consideration
given. Section 549(c) precludes the trustee from avoiding transfers of real estate made for
fair value to certain categories of good faith purchasers.
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These provisions have several obvious ramifications on software
escrow. If the escrowed source code is property of the estate, the
trustee can demand its return and can prevent any subsequent trans-
fer.59 Additionally, if the escrowed code is the property of the
debtor-proprietor prior to bankruptcy, any contractual provision that
purports to transfer it to a third party upon the proprietor's insol-
vency or bankruptcy probably will be void. The critical issue, there-
fore, is whether the escrowed code constitutes property of the
estate.60
Many of the cases decided under section 541 reflect an effort to
balance two competing policies: maximizing the value of the estate,
while dealing fairly with creditors. A number of cases that have
placed greater weight on the former factor have treated property in
which the debtor has any interest, however attenuated, as property
of the estate. 6 1 For example, courts have held that progress pay-
ments due to a bankrupt contractor are property of the estate
notwithstanding a claim made by the contractor's surety,62 and that a
surplus realized in a prebankruptcy foreclosure sale of the debtor's
property is property of the estate, even though a lien on the surplus
existed prior to bankruptcy. 63 Other courts have emphasized the
general principle that the trustee's title "is acquired subject to the
equities of third persons, and where it appears that the debtor is only
a trustee and has no beneficial interest in or claim against the prop-
erty, the property will be turned over to the true owner." 64 Courts
emphasizing the rights of third parties have held that a real estate
broker's commission in which the seller-debtors had no remaining
interest are not included in the property of the estate65 and that the
59 It has been widely recognized that intellectual property may constitute estate prop-
erty for bankruptcy purposes. See R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 1.07 (1982). Accord-
ingly, if escrowed source code were found to be property of the estate, the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction would extend both to the physical property represented by the medium
bearing the code (tape, disk, etc.) and the intellectual property embodied in the code.
60 The existence of the requisite property interest is determined according to
nonbankruptcy law. See In re Newcomb, 744 F.2d 621, 625-26 (8th Cir. 1984) (reference to
Missouri property law).
61 This expansive view of the definition of estate property is perhaps best articulated
in In re Brown, 22 Bankr. 844, 848-49 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982).
62 In re Glover Constr. Co., 30 Bankr. 873 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
63 Brown, 22 Bankr. at 849-50.
64 In re Georgian Villa, 10 Bankr. 79, 83-84 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 198 1). See also George v.
Kitchens By Rice Bros., 665 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1981) (property held by debtors as trustees is
not property of estate); In re Shepard, 29 Bankr. 928, 932 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) ("Under
the Bankruptcy Code, where a debtor holds only bare legal title to property without any
equitable interest, bare legal title is all that becomes property of the estate. . . a trustee in
bankruptcy succeeds to only such title and rights in property as the debtor had at the time
the petition was filed."); 4 L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 541.01 (15th ed. 1983).
65 Strafford Say. Bank v. Bruce, 122 N.H. 557, 560, 448 A.2d 373, 375 (1982) (in
state court litigation parallel to bankruptcy proceeding, held that seller-debtors "had no
equitable interest in real estate broker's commission and it should have been excluded
from their bankruptcy estate").
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estate has no property interest in a lease or other contract that has
terminated by its own terms66 or because of a default by the debtor 7
prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.
The pragmatic approach often taken in an effort to reconcile
these policies is reflected in a series of cases dealing with financial
escrows. For example, in Carlson v. Farmers Home Administration (In re
Newcomb) 6s the federal government obtained a judgment against the
debtor prior to bankruptcy. The debtor placed money satisfying the
judgment in escrow pursuant to an agreement of the parties, to be
paid to the government if the court of appeals affirmed the judg-
ment. Soon after the court of appeals affirmed the judgment, but
before the government was paid the escrowed funds, the debtor filed
bankruptcy and the trustee brought an action in the bankruptcy
court6 9 to recover the money.
The bankruptcy court found for the trustee, but the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed. One of the issues addressed on appeal was whether
payment of the escrowed funds to the government would constitute
a postbankruptcy transfer of estate property in violation of section
549. 70 Looking to nonbankrtupcy law, the court of appeals asked
whether in fact there would be a transfer of a substantial property
interest of the debtor: "we look to the real substance of the interests
transferred, not to whether those interests are referred to as 'legal
title' or 'equitable interest.' ,,71 Finding that the debtor had trans-
ferred the property at the time he created the escrow as a matter of
"real substance," the court denied the trustee's claim. 72
The court in Wilson v. Chicago Title Insurance Co. (In re D. Jay Hy-
man Construction Co.) reached a similar result. 7 3 In that case, prior to
the bankruptcy, the debtor placed money in escrow as a condition to
obtaining title insurance. The escrow agent was supposed to release
the funds to a construction company that had claim against the
debtor if the company obtained a judgment. The company obtained
judgment prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy. The court
rejected the trustee's effort to recover the escrowed funds on the
66 In re Advent Corp., 24 Bankr. 612, 614 (Bankr. App. 1st Cir. 1982) ("The Bank-
ruptcy Code neither enlarges the rights of a debtor under a contract, a Customs bond, nor
prevents the termination of a contract by its own terms."). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(2), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 363(a), 98 Stat. 333, 363 (1984) ("Property of the es-
tate does not include . . . any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of nonresi-
dential real property that has terminated .. .before the commencement of the case").
67 In re Depoy, 29 Bankr. 466 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (where debtors in material
default under lease prior to filing of bankruptcy, termination and eviction will not be
stayed).
68 744 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1984).
69 In re Newcomb, 32 Bankr. 96 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983).
70 744 F.2d at 624-25. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
71 Id. at 626.
72 Id. at 626-27.
73 15 Bankr. 765 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981).
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ground that any real interest of the debtor had been extinguished at
the time the judgment was rendered. 74
The court in Heckler Land Development Corp. v. Township of Mont-
gomery (In re Heckler Land Development Corp.)75 reached a different re-
sult. Prior to bankruptcy, the debtor had begun a construction
project for the town and had established an escrow account to secure
its performance. When the debtor filed for bankruptcy before it had
completed the project, the town sought to recover the escrowed
funds. The bankruptcy court rejected the claim, finding that the
town was merely a creditor trying to collect a prebankruptcy indebt-
edness. 76 Although the opinion is cryptic, the factor that distin-
guishes the case from Hyman Construction and Newcomb is probably the
relative lack of certainty in the third party's claim against the es-
crowed funds. Since neither the validity nor the amount of the
town's claim was beyond dispute, the estate's interest in the fund,
while not absolute, did amount to a matter of "real substance." 77
The foregoing cases suggest that a court required to decide
whether escrowed source code constitutes property of the estate will
examine the substantiality of the debtor-proprietor's interest in the
code since the commencement of the bankruptcy case. If that inter-
est is substantial, the court may permit the trustee to recover the
code. 78 Moreover, a provision in the escrow agreement that pur-
ports to transfer all interest in the code to the user or escrow agent
upon the occurrence of a contingency defined in terms of the finan-
cial condition of the proprietor will be void. 79 The goal in drafting
the escrow, therefore, must be to minimize the proprietor's interest
in the escrowed materials and the intellectual property that they em-
body, either initially or upon the occurrence of a contingency that
the agreement defines in nonfinancial terms and is likely to precede
bankruptcy, without jeopardizing the proprietor's intellectual prop-
erty protection.80 The drafter must take advantage of the policy
74 Id. at 767.
75 15 Bankr. 856 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
76 Id. at 858-59.
77 Newcomb, 744 F.2d at 626.
78 As discussed in note 39 supra, the trustee is more likely to have an incentive to
recover the code in a liquidation proceeding than in a reorganization proceeding.
A further illustration of the problem of defining property of the estate is the question
whether a bank's payment of a letter of credit that guarantees an obligation of the debtor
constitutes distribution of estate property. Payment has been allowed on the theory that
the property of the bank is being distributed, with no new obligation on the debtor's part
being created; payment has been forbidden where it would give rise to a security interest
against the debtor in favor of the bank. Compare In re North Shore & Cent. Ill. Freight Co.,
30 Bankr. 377 (Bankr. N.D. II!. 1983) and In re Page, 18 Bankr. 713 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1982)
(payment allowed), with In re Twist Cap Inc., 1 Bankr. 284 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1979) (pay-
ment stayed). See generally Baird, Standby Letters of Credit in Bankruptcy, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
130 (1982).
79 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
80 See infra text accompanying notes 96-106.
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favoring vulnerable third parties when, in a pragmatic sense, the
debtor is not the true owner of the property.8'
3. Automatic Stay
A final set of questions arises under the automatic stay provi-
sions of section 362 of the Code.8 2 Pursuant to section 362(a), the
filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an automatic stay of any
judicial action against the debtor,8 3 any act to obtain possession of or
control over property of the estate,84 and any act to create, perfect,
or enforce a lien against property of the estate.8 5 The violator may
be in contempt of court for any violation of the automatic stay.8 6
Pursuant to section 362(c), the stay continues until the affected prop-
erty is no longer part of the estate.8 7
Sections 362(d)-(f) provide a procedure for an aggrieved party
to seek relief from the stay. After notice and hearing, the bankruptcy
court "shall grant relief" to an aggrieved party who can demonstrate
that its interest is no adequately protected, or that the debtor does
not have "an equity" in the affected property and the property is not
necessary to an effective organization.88 If the Court does not hold a
hearing within thirty days of a request for relief, the stay termi-
nates.8 9 The court also has the power to grant ex parte relief from
the stay if the affected party would otherwise suffer irreparable harm
to its interests. 90
In the source code escrow context, the automatic stay provision
may be an important means of enforcing the rules relating to prop-
erty of the estate. If the escrowed code is property of the estate, the
provision will stay any effort to take possession of it by or on behalf
of the user. The stay prohibits both judicial and self-help efforts.
Thus, if the code is property of the estate, even if it is in the hands of
the escrow agent at the time of bankruptcy, any attempt by the user
to retrieve it may run afoul of the stay and create a risk of contempt.
The policy behind section 362 and its Bankruptcy Act predeces-
sor,9' however, is similar to the policy underlying section 541: the
debtor should be protected from creditor harassment, but not at the
expense of innocent third parties.92 This policy is illustrated by a
81 See id. for specific suggestions for achieving this delicate balance.
82 11 U.S.C. § 362.
83 Id. § 362(a)(1).
84 Id. § 362(a)(3).
85 Id. § 362(a)(5).
86 See, e.g., In re Holland, 21 Bankr. 681, 689 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1982).
87 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1).
88 Id. § 362(d).
89 Id. § 362(e).
90 Id. § 362(0.
91 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 29, at § 29.
92 See, e.g., Schulze v. Schulze, 15 Bankr. 106, 109 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (citing
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line of authority holding that the debtor should not use the stay to
deprive third parties of the benefits of acts that have been completed
prior to the filing of bankruptcy. 93 If, for example, a lease or license
lawfully terminates prior to bankruptcy, but bankruptcy occurs
before the termination is effective, section 362 will not stay the ter-
mination if at the time of bankruptcy "nothing remained to complete
the termination process, except the mere passage of time." '94
This policy and the decisions based on it are relevant to source
code escrow in two important respects. Generally, a user who is de-
pendent on the debtor's software should be able to argue persua-
sively that denial of access to the source code via the, stay would
contravene the purposes of section 362.9 5 More specifically, the au-
thority just discussed suggests that a user may avoid the effects of the
stay if the agreement conditions the turnover of source code to the
user on some nonfinancial event likely to occur prior to bankruptcy
(such as an explicit measure of failure to maintain), so that the turno-
ver process can be substantially completed before the bankruptcy pe-
tition is filed.
C. Drafting Recommendations
There is no simple, foolproof solution to the problem of draft-
ing source code escrow agreements that will be enforceable in bank-
ruptcy. The drafting process involves striking a balance between the
proprietor's trade secret concerns and the user's desire to have as
much of the transaction as possible consummated before a bank-
ruptcy proceeding begins. The point at which the balance is struck
in a particular transaction will depend on the relative bargaining po-
sitions of the parties and how seriously each side views its potential
problems. 96 Because a workable escrow arrangement requires con-
policy under current Code, court declines to stay domestic proceeding against debtor);
Preferred Surfacing, Inc. v. Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co., 400 F. Supp. 280, 284 (N.D. Ga.
1975) (discussion of policy under former Act). Note also that sections 362(d)-(f), which
provide a variety of remedies for parties aggrieved by a stay, strongly imply that the stay
should not be used to impose unfair burdens on innocent third parties.
93 See, e.g., In re Depoy, 29 Bankr. 466, 470 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (eviction of
debtor and recovery of leased premises by landlord will not be stayed where lease has
terminated prior to bankruptcy because of debtor's default); In re Beck, 5 Bankr. 169, 170
(Bankr. D. Hawaii 1980) (court refuses to stay termination of license where notice given
prior to bankruptcy, to take effect after bankruptcy proceeding commenced). The Depoy-
Beck result has been codified with respect to leases of nonresidential real estate in current
§ 541(b)(2). See supra note 66.
94 Beck, 5 Bankr. at 170.
95 As part of a larger case that escrowed source code should not be treated as prop-
erty of the estate, a user who is dependent on the debtor's software can argue that denial
of access to the code via the stay would victimize an innocent third party who is not en-
gaged in the sort of creditor harassment that § 362 was intended to prevent.
96 To cite an extreme example, a user of well-tested, mass-marketed software will not
be in a position to demand that a vendor establish an enforceable escrow for its protection.
Where the vendor produces a relatively small number of high-priced, custom designed
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siderable compromise on both sides, a party seeking to tip the bal-
ance markedly in its favor should be prepared to pay for the
extraordinary concessions that the other side may have to make.97
As previously noted,98 each of the theories available to attack an
escrow arrangement is equally applicable to the license that provided
the user with object code. Obviously, if the object code license ter-
minates after the proprietor's bankruptcy, the user has no further
right to use the software in any way, and the availability of source
code for maintenance and update purposes is a moot issue. Accord-
ingly, the user faces a continuum of risk, from the worst case in
which the trustee terminates the underlying object code license,
through the middle ground in which the user retains the right to use
code escrowed through the date of bankruptcy, to the best case in
which the user both retains delivered code and continues to receive
updated code from a debtor-proprietor that remains in business.
The recommendations offered here are made from the viewpoint of
the user. They are cumulative, and a court's rejection of any particu-
lar provision results in only a single step backward along the contin-
uum of risk.
1. General Recommendations
a. Multiple Contracts
The Bankruptcy Code may permit a trustee to reject an entire
agreement even if only a portion is still executory. 99 Thus, the
trustee of a proprietor who has escrowed a series of source code up-
dates may be in a position not only to avoid future maintenance obli-
gations, but also to demand the return of past updates. To minimize
this risk, the user should seek multiple contracts so that a trustee can
not recall completed deliveries as a portion of a single executory
contract. For example, the parties may divide the overall agreement
into an object code license, a source code agreement, and a mainte-
nance agreement. Each contract should have a separately negotiated
bona fide consideration. Similarly, the user should avoid unitary
long-term contracts; the National Football League model of a series
of short-term contracts is preferable.
software packages, however, each transaction may be of such significance that it will be
willing to assume some small risk to its intellectual property protection to meet a prospec-
tive user's demands.
97 The authors frequently remind clients that in acquiring a computer system, a cus-
tomer is purchasing not only a product but also a relationship. Just as the customer would
be willing to pay a higher price for a superior product, he or she should be open to the
possibility of paying somewhat more to improve the quality of the relationship.
98 See supra note 37.
99 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 10
SOFTWARE ESCROW IN BANKRUPTCY
b. Minimizing Future Obligations
The user should avoid including in the underlying object code
license any future obligations of the proprietor (maintenance, for ex-
ample) that are not essential to the current use of the software. Any
such future obligations should be in an agreement separate from the
underlying license.
c. Present Grant of Rights
The user should avoid any agreement that purports. to obligate
the proprietor to grant rights in the source code only upon the oc-
currence of a future event, particularly if that event is tied to the
financial condition of the proprietor. The user should insist that the
proprietor grant either it or the escrow agent present, but suitably
restricted, rights in the source code.
d. Rights in Physical Property
In the event of the proprietor's bankruptcy, the user may have to
return any source code that is "property of the estate."' 0 0 To mini-
mize this problem,the user should seek to avoid the retention by the
proprietor of substantial physical property rights in the copy of the
source code deposited in escrow. From the user's perspective, it
would be preferable for the proprietor to assign the copy of the
source code to either the user or the escrow agent. Of course, a pro-
prietor seeking to maintain trade secret protection probably would
object to this agreement. Alternatively, the user might obtain a pres-
ent, but limited, license to the source code, that makes a present
grant of contingent future rights of access and use. 01 In either case,
the proprietor should have no right to require the return of the
user's copy of the source code; rather, the agreement should obligate
the escrow agent or user to destroy the copy, or simply to hold it in
confidence until it is outdated and no longer of any value.
e. Status of Escrow Agent
To minimize the probability that a court will deem the escrowed
code property of the estate, the agreement should clearly define the
status of the escrow agent as either an independent contractor or an
agent of the user. The escrow agent should never be a mere custo-
dian of the source code or an agent or bailee of the proprietor. The
contract should obligate the escrow agent to the proprietor to main-
tain the confidentiality of the source code.
100 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
lo For example, the agreement may make a present grant to the user of the right to
use the source code, but provide further that the code may be examined only by the es-
crowee as agent of the user unless and until a carefully defined maintenance failure occurs.
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f Maintenance by Escrow Agent
The proprietor may resist any agreement that results in the
transfer or disclosure of source code to the user absent its bank-
ruptcy or a judicial (and thus time-consuming) determination of in-
adequate maintenance. Accordingly, the user should consider an
agreement that does not require or permit the escrow agent to trans-
fer source code to the user, but instead permits the escrow agent to
use the source code to maintain the user's object code. When enter-
ing such an agreement, the parties must choose an agent who has the
capability to use the escrowed source code to maintain the program.
g. Definition of Default
The user should avoid any agreement that conditions the trans-
fer of the source code from proprietor to escrow agent or from es-
crow agent to user upon any default defined in terms of the financial
condition of the proprietor. 10 2 The user should seek to define de-
fault in terms of inadequate maintenance by the proprietor and to
have any transfer to the user completed prior to the bankruptcy of
the proprietor. To avoid the argument that the default clause is a
disguised financial condition clause, the user should insist that the
agreement contain recitations concerning the importance to the user
of adequate performance.
2. Suggested Model
In view of the general considerations just discussed, the authors
suggest three separate agreements: an object code license, a source
code license, and a maintenance agreement. This model does not
include all the terms that are appropriate in licensing or maintenance
agreements.10 3 It discusses only those terms that strike the balance
between the proprietor's disclosure of proprietary information and
the user's ability to enforce the agreement in the event of the propri-
etor's bankruptcy.
a. Object Code License
This license should contain all the customary provisions of an
object code license, but should not include any continuing obliga-
tions of the proprietor with respect to maintenance. The license
should not require return of the code at its termination, but should
require the user to maintain the object code in confidence for some
period well in excess of its useful life, as determined by the proprie-
tor, or to certify its destruction.
102 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
103 For a general review of software licensing, see J. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW § 3.13 (1983).
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b. Source Code Agreement
(i) Grant of Rights
This agreement should contain a present grant of limited rights
in the source code. In descending order of desirability from the per-
spective of the user's concern for enforceability in bankruptcy, this
grant may be:
(a) a present assignment to the user of the source code and sup-
porting materials, with the escrow agent retaining physical pos-
session pending the specified contingencies;
(b) a similar present assignment to the escrow agent;
(c) a present license to the user to make limited use of the source
code upon the happening of specified contingencies, with the
escrow agent otherwise retaining physical possession;
(d) a similar present license to the escrow agent. It is unacceptable
for the proprietor merely to contract to grant rights in the
source code upon the occurrence of a future event.
(ii) Restrictions on Disclosure of the Source Code to
Third Parties.
The agreement should contain restrictions on the right of the
escrow agent and the user to disclose the source code to third par-
ties. In descending order of likelihood of enforceability in the event
of bankruptcy, the restriction may be:
(a) the obligation not to disclose the source code for a specified
term in excess of the proprietor's estimate of its useful life;
(b) the obligation not to disclose the source code for an unlimited
period of time;
(c) the obligation not to disclose the source code for a specified
term together with the obligation to destroy the source code at
the end of that term. The agreement should not require the
user and escrow agent to return the source code to the proprie-
tor. The agreement may, however, grant the proprietor the
right to supervise and verify the destruction of the code.
(iii) Conditions on Use by or Disclosure to User
The agreement must provide for the use by or disclosure to the
user of the source code under certain conditions. In descending or-
der of likelihood of enforceability in the event of bankruptcy, the
provision may be:
(a) that the escrow agent may not transfer or disclose the source
code to the user, but may maintain and update the object code
upon request or certification by the user;1 ° 4
(b) that the escrow agent may disclose,but not assign the source
code to the user upon the user's request or certification of in-
104 Software proprietors sometimes insist that the agreement be written to require a
judicial or quasi-judicial determination of inadequate maintenance. From the user's per-
spective, the delay likely to be caused by such a determination may defeat the purpose of
the escrow arrangement.
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adequate maintenance. The triggering event should never re-
late to the financial condition of the proprietor.
c. Maintenance Agreement
(i) Term
In bankruptcy, the proprietor can avoid future maintenance ob-
ligations as executory. In structuring the maintenance agreement,
the user's goal must be to preserve for its benefit as much of the
completed maintenance work as possible. The greatest danger here
is that upon the rejection of the entire maintenance agreement as a
unitary executory contract, the trustee may demand return of all pre-
viously completed maintenance work. 10 5 Accordingly, the form of
the agreement should not be a single contract for the ongoing main-
tenance of the program during the term of the underlying license,
but should be a series of contracts for relatively short fixed terms.
(ii) Consideration
There also should be separate consideration due for each term
of the maintenance agreement.
(iii) Obligations of Proprietor
The agreement should obligate the proprietor to maintain the
program and periodically to deliver updated object code and source
code to either the user or the escrow agent. The proprietor should
not have any other future obligation unless it is essential to the
transaction.
(iv) Status of Code
The agreement should contain a provision for the automatic li-
cense to th user of the updated object code without any further ac-
tion by the proprietor. In addition, the agreement should provide
for the automatic grant of rights in the updated source code. This
grant should parallel that in the source code agreement.
(v) Restrictions on Foreclosure
The agreement should contain restrictions on the right of the
escrow agent and the user to disclose the updated source code to
third parties, which should also parallel those in the source code
agreement. The agreement should not require the escrow agent to
return the source code to the proprietor, but may grant the proprie-
tor the right to supervise and verify the destruction of the code.
105 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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(vi) Conditions on User
The agreement must provide for the use by or disclosure to the
user of the updated source code under certain conditions. The
terms of use or disclosure should parallel those in the source code
agreement. The triggering event should never relate to the financial
condition of the proprietor.
(vii) Status of Escrow Agents
The agreement specifically should identify the escrow agent as
either an agent of the user or an independent contractor. The agree-
ment should never identify the escrow agent as either a mere custo-
dian or an agent or bailee of the proprietor.'0 6
III. The International Perspective
In international software transactions that involve American
proprietors or users, the parties sometimes place source code in es-
crow outside the United States. A foreign proprietor, for example,
may insist on placing the code in escrow in its country because of
concerns about trade secret protection. Conversely, a foreign user
may insist that the code be kept in its country to facilitate access. In
some circumstances, the parties may agree to escrow the code in a
third country in the belief that its laws will enhance security and min-
imize the possibility of governmental interference with the
arrangement.' 0 7
Enforceability in the event of the proprietor's bankruptcy is as
much a concern in an international escrow arrangement as in a do-
mestic one. A user dealing with a foreign proprietor must consider
the potential effect of the bankruptcy law of the country in which it is
incorporated or headquartered or has substantial assets. The law of
the country of the physical location of the escrowed code also may
become relevant.
106 If the escrow agent is identified as a custodian for the benefit of the proprietor, he
or she may be subject to the automatic turnover requirement of § 543 of the Code. See
supra note 57 and accompanying text. The identification of the escrow agent as a bailee or
agent of the proprietor will increase the likelihood that the proprietor will be found to
have a substantial property interest in the escrowed code, which in turn may lead to a
finding that the code is property of the estate. See supra notes 61-77 and accompanying
text.
107 A related issue is the growing trend toward the imposition of some form of control
on the transfer of electronically stored data across international boundaries. Such control
may range from requiring registration to limiting or prohibiting certain kinds of transac-
tions. The rationales asserted range from protection of privacy to concerns about "tech-
nological imperialism." Because an escrow arrangement may contemplate the transfer of
electronically stored data across international boundaries, the possibility of applicable re-
strictions must be considered. For a recent review of this issue, see G. CABANELLAS, ANTI-
TRUST AND DIRECT REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
TRANSACTIONS (1984).
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A. The Scope of the Problem
International law recognizes two major theories of bankruptcy:
the territorial theory and the universal theory.' 08 Under the territo-
rial theory, the status of the alleged bankrupt must be separately ad-
judicated in each country in which it has assets. Thus, a
determination in one country that a company is bankrupt has no
binding effect on assets and claims against assets in another country.
Under the universal theory, an adjudication in one country that a
company is bankrupt incapacitates that company in all countries in
which it does business. While local law may control asset-related
questions, such as preferences and the enforcement of security inter-
ests, one adjudication will determine the status of the bankrupt. The
universal theory requires implementation by international treaty.
Although much effort has been devoted to adoption of the uni-
versal theory, the countries of Western Europe have yet to agree on
it. The members of the European Economic Community (the Com-
mon Market) have considered, but have not yet ratified, a draft con-
vention on bankruptcy which embodies the universal theory.' 0 9 The
country in which the debtor's "center of administration" is located
has jurisdiction over the bankruptcy," 1 0 including the disposition of
assets in other states that are parties to the Convention."' The
bankruptcy divests the debtor of his right to administer his assets in
any of the participating states. As in American bankruptcy law, the
Convention reserves certain matters for determination under local
law. These matters include the powers of a liquidator, the status of
leases, the determination of the rights of secured parties, and the
question of preferences.112
If adopted, the Convention would greatly simplify the identifica-
tion of bankrupts and the administration of bankrupts' estates. The
present draft of the Convention does not, however, deal explicitly
with issues like those covered by sections 541 (property of the estate)
and 365 (executory contracts)"13 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code. Moreover, the Convention's general policy is to refer ques-
108 For a discussion of these theories and their recognition among the countries of
western Europe, see COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) § 6101.03. Belgium, for example, recog-
nizes the universal theory, see id.; AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY LAWS 71 (I. Ross ed. 1974); while France follows the territorial
approach, see id. at 106, and Italy uses both approaches concurrently. See id. at 136-38.
The ABA volume provides a useful introduction to the history and general contours of
bankruptcy law in the countries of Western Europe.
109 European Economic Community, Draft of a Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-
Up, Arrangements, Compositions and Similar Proceedings (1980 draft), reprinted in CoM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 6111-6221 hereinafter cited as EEC Convention.
I 10 Id. art. 3.
I11 Id. art. 34.
112 See, e.g., id. arts. 29, 36, 39, 40, 46.
113 But cf. id. art. 39 (referring questions concerning leases to local law).
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tions about the status of particular assets and obligations to local law.
Accordingly, it seems likely that even if the European Economic
Community ratifies the Convention, local law will continue to decide
most questions pertaining to the enforceability of software escrow
agreements. In most cases, "local law" will mean the law of the na-
tion where the escrowed property is physical located. However, the
law of the bankrupt's headquarters or principal place of business, or
the law of the nation where the parties execute the escrow agreement
might decide some questions. 1 4 Clearly, the Convention would not
obviate the duty to consider the potential effect of the bankruptcy
laws of every nation having a substantial relation to the transaction.
B. Two Case Studies
Given the current lack of international structure, the lawyer ar-
ranging an international escrow agreement has no choice but to con-
sider the potential effect of the bankruptcy laws of the nation where
the escrowed property is to be located, as well as of the nations
where the foreign principals are located. This section discusses spe-
cifically some of the problems that a lawyer may be encounter in
structuring an arrangement where a proprietor in Great Britain or
the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) establishes a
software escrow in its own country for the benefit of an American
user. The problems a lawyer faces in these two countries are typical
of those encountered in a number of other western European na-
tions." 5 Most of these problems are analogous to issues that arise
under the American Bankruptcy Code.
1. Great Britain
Several English statutes deal with bankruptcy-related issues.
Two of the most important of these are the Bankruptcy Act of
1914116 and the Companies Act of 1948," 17 which deals with the
"winding up" of companies for a variety of reasons, including insol-
114 Pursuant to article 36 of the EEC Convention, for example, issues concerning pref-
erences are resolved under the law of the state where the affected assets are located at the
time the proceeding is commenced. Similarly, article 39, which deals with leases of "im-
movable property," and article 40, which deals with contracts for the sale of such property,
refer to the law of the state where the property is located. These provisions suggest a
general tendency to refer all questions concerning the status of property to the law of the
jurisdiction where it is physically located. In the absence of any provisions that deal ex-
pressly with the status of intellectual property or with arrangements in the nature of es-
crows, however, it would seem imprudent to ignore other arguably relevant bodies of local
law.
115 See generally AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, supra note 108.
116 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, as amended [hereinafter cited as Bank-
ruptcy Act].
117 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, as amended [hereinafter cited as
Companies Act].
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vency. The following material discusses provisions of these two stat-
utes that are particularly relevant to source code escrow.
Section 53 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that upon commence-
ment of the bankruptcy, the property of the debtor vests immediately
in the trustee." 18 Pursuant to section 48, the property of the debtor
includes all forms of property, whether tangible or intangible. l 19
The Act does not specify the level of interest required to characterize
an asset as "property of the debtor."
Section 54(1) of the Bankruptcy Act permits the trustee to dis-
claim property that consists of "unprofitable contracts."' 12 0 This
provision is analogous to the American trustee's right to reject bur-
densome executory contracts.
Sections 243 and 244 of the Companies Act empower the liqui-
dator of a company to "take into his custody or under his control all
the property and things in action to which the company is or appears
to be entitled."' 2' The Act does not otherwise define the relevant
property. Upon application to the supervising court by the liquida-
tion and entry of an appropriate order, "property of whatsoever de-
scription belonging to the company or held by trustees on its behalf
shall vest in the liquidator by his official name."1 22
The Companies Act contains other provisions relevant to source
code escrow. Section 268 provides the court supervising the wind-
118 Bankruptcy Act, § 53(1) ("immediately on a debtor being adjudged bankrupt, the
property of the bankrupt shall vest in the trustee"), (2) ("On the appointment of a trustee,
the property shall forthwith pass to and vest in the trustee appointed."). Adjudication of
bankruptcy is accomplished by resolution of the creditors or court order. Id. See also id.
§ 18(1).
119 Id. § 48. Section 48, which is entitled "Realisation of Property," gives directions to
the trustee for taking possession of many kinds of property, including "deeds, books, and
documents of the bankrupt, and all other parts of his property capable of manual deliv-
ery," id. § 48(1); "stocks, shares in ships, shares, or any other property transferable in the
books of any company, office, or person," id. § 48(3); "property . . . of copyhold or cus-
tomary tenure, or . . . any like property passing by surrender or admittance or in any
similar manner," id. § 48(4); and "things in action," id. § 48(5).
120 Id. § 54(1). The categories of property that may be disclaimed include "land of
any tenure burdened with onerous covenants, . . . shares of stock in companies, . . . un-
profitable contracts, or. . . any other property that is unsaleable, or not readily saleable,
by reason of it binding the possessor thereof to any onerous act, or to the payment of any
sum of money .... " The disclaimer operates to divest the bankrupt of all interest in the
property disclaimed. d. § 54(2). The trustee may not disclaim a lease without leave of
court. id. § 54(3). A party interested in particular property may call upon the trustee in
writing to make a decision concerning disclaimer, and a party with an interest in a contract
may similarly call upon the trustee to disclaim or adopt it. Id. § 54(4). The court may
rescind contracts between the bankrupt and other parties, awarding damages or other re-
lief to the affected party, id. § 54(5), and may also order the vesting of disclaimed property
in third parties "on such terms as the court thinks just." Id. § 54(6).
121 Companies Act, § 243(1).
122 Id. § 244. The liquidator may thereafter "bring in his official name any action or
other legal proceeding which relates to that property or which it is necessary to bring or
defend for the purpose of effectually winding up the company and recovering its prop-
erty." Id.
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ing up of a company with broad powers to summon for examination
any person suspected of holding company property or of having in-
formation concerning company property.' 23 Section 323(1), which
resembles section 54(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, permits a company's
liquidator to disclaim "unprofitable contracts."1 24 Section 328 pro-
vides that it is a criminal offense for an officer of the bankrupt com-
pany to fail to "discover" and "deliver up" to the liquidator all
company property. 125
These statutory provisions suggest possible problems analogous
to, the "property of the estate" and "executory contract" problems
encountered under the American Bankruptcy Code. However, the
reported cases and secondary sources generally available to Ameri-
can lawyers provide even less guidance than the American sources
on the application of the statutes in the source code escrow
context.' 26
2. Federal Republic of Germany
West German law recognizes two principal types of insolvency
proceedings: bankruptcy and court or mandatory composition. 27
The precondition for either type of proceeding is an inability to meet
obligations in due course, or the inability of a corporation to meet
obligations in excess of assets.' 28 Creditors generally initiate bank-
ruptcy proceedings, which usually result in liquidation. 129 Only the
debtor can initiate mandatory composition proceedings. 130 During
the pendency of a composition proceeding, the debtor remains in
123 Id. § 268(1). The court may summon "any officer of the company or person known
or suspected to have in his possession any property of the company . . . or any person
whom the court deems capable of giving information concerning the. . . affairs or prop-
erty of the company." Id. Such persons may be examined under oath, id. § 268(2), and
compelled to produce documents, id. § 268(3), and are subject to arrest if they fail to
appear. Id. § 268(4).
124 Id. § 323(1). The provisions of § 323 are virtually identical to those of § 541 of the
Bankruptcy Act. See supra note 120.
125 Id. § 328(1).
126 Annotations of decisions under the Bankruptcy and Companies Acts may be found
in 3 & 5 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND (3d ed. 1968, with Cont'n Vols.). General
discussions of English bankruptcy law that are widely available in American law libraries
include Bateson & Grant, The Commercial Laws of England (1983), in 4 DIGEST OF COMMER-
CIAL LAws OF THE WORLD (L. Nelson ed. 1984); AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, supra note 108, at
75-85.
127 See M. PELZER, GERMAN INSOLVENCY LAws 1-2, 15 (1975). This volume provides a
German text of the West German insolvency laws as well as a section-by-section English
translation and commentary. Before reliance is placed on the translation of a particular
section, that section can be checked for recent amendment in the official West Germany
statutory sources. See infra notes 134-35. General discussion of West German insolvency
law may be found in AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 108, at 121-32; Esser, Ruster & Zahn,
The Commercial Laws of the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin (1980), in 4 DIGEST OF
COMMERCIAL LAwS OF THE WORLD (L. Nelson ed. 1984).
128 M. PELZER, Supra note 127, at 12, 15.
129 Id. at 1-3.
130 Id. at 15.
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possession and control of his assets, subject to court supervision.' 3 '
The result of a successful composition is a plan that the court and a
majority of creditors must approve and that will be binding on dis-
senting creditors.' 3 2 Even when creditors have initiated bankruptcy
proceedings, the debtor can apply to the court to suspend those pro-
ceedings and commence a composition. 33
The Bankruptcy Act, or Konkursordnung of 1877, often referred
to as the KO,' 3 4 sets forth the substantive and procedural law of
bankruptcy. The Act on Court Compositions, or Vergleichsordnung of
1935, often referred to as the VerglO,' 3 5 governs compositions.
Several provisions of each statute are relevant to source code escrow.
Section 117 of the KO requires the receiver to take immediate
custody of all property of the bankrupt.' 3 6 The KO does not other-
wise define the relevant properties. The public announcement of the
proceedings effects an immediate attachment of all the bankrupt's
property.' 3 7 Section 118 enjoins all persons having possession of
such property from returning it to the bankrupt or otherwise using it
for the bankrupt's benefit' 38 and requires them to notify the re-
ceiver13 9 and produce the property on demand. 140 Persons holding
estate property who fail to notify the receiver are liable for actual
damages.' 41 The effect of these provisions appears to be similar to
that of the provisions dealing with the property of the estate and
stays in American bankruptcy law, because they identify and freeze
estate property upon the filing of bankruptcy.
Section 17 of the KO deals with bilateral contracts, defined only
as contracts imposing mutually dependent obligations.' 42 When the
contract is wholly or partially unperformed at the commencement of
bankruptcy proceedings, the receiver may perform on behalf of the
bankrupt and demand performance from the nonbankrupt party.' 43
The KO does not address the complementary question whether the
nonbankrupt party may demand performance from the receiver.
131 Id. at 18-19.
132 Id. at 19-21.
133 Id. at 15.
'34 Konkursordnung vom 1877, as amended, RGBI.S.351 [hereinafter cited as KO],
translated in M. PELZER, supra note 127, at 26-130.
135 Vergleichsordnung vom 1935, as amended, RGBI.I S.321, ber.S.356 [hereinafter cited
as VerglOl, translated in M. PELZER, supra note 127, at 131-206.
136 KO, § 117(1).
137 Id. § 118.
138 Id.
'39 Id.
140 Id. § 120.
141 Id. § 119.
142 Id. § 17. The definition appears in the heading of the section. Pelzer translates the
definition of "contracts where performance and considerations sic. are dependent of sic.
each other." M. PELZER, supra note 127, at 34.
143 KO, § 17(1). To insist on performance, the receiver must give the other party
prompt notice of his intention to do so. Id. § 17(2).
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Given the broad powers of the receiver and the limitations on the
rights of third parties expressed elsewhere in the KO, 14 4 the prudent
operating assumption is probably that a court will answer this ques-
tion in the negative.
Section 21 of the KO comes closer than any other to dealing
with licenses. It provides that a lease or rental contract remains valid
against the estate when the leased item is already in the possession of
a nonbankrupt lessee.145 One might argue that this section evinces a
policy in favor of protecting innocent lessees and, by analogy, licen-
sees against arbitrary and potentially damaging dispossession.
Section 237 of the KO permits execution of foreign bankruptcy
judgments against assets located in Germany. 146 This ability is sub-
ject to any exceptions that the Chancellor may create.
Sections 36 and 50 of the VerglO deal with the status of con-
tracts during composition proceedings. Section 36 deals with con-
tract claims against the estate. A creditor who has not fully
performed at the commencement of the composition proceedings
has no claim. 147 If the contract is divisible, however, the creditor
may make a claim for the value of completed installments. 148 Sec-
tion 36 is also further evidence of a general policy of favoring the
estate in contract matters even at the expense of the interest of the
nonbankrupt party.
Pursuant to section 50(1), a creditor may refuse to perform its
obligations under a contract with the debtor, if both parties had fur-
ther obligations at the commencement of the proceedings. 149 This
refusal requires court approval. 150 The VErglO, like the KO, does
not address the question of the debtor's right to refuse to perform.
Again, the prudent assumption is that the creditor cannot compel the
debtor to perform.
Sections 58 through 60, 62, and 63 of the VerglO are also rele-
vant to source code escrow. The court may impose restrictions on
the disposal of assets by the composition debtor, on its own motion
144 Note, for example, the limits on the rights of third parties to deal with estate prop-
erty and the receiver's authority to reclaim estate property from such parties. See supra
notes 136-41 and accompanying text. The statute also limits the ability of creditors to
pursue legal remedies against the debtor and the estate once the bankruptcy proceeding
has begun. See KO, §§ 11-15.
145 Id. § 21(1). Section 21(3) gives a lessee of the bankrupt the right to set off any
claim he may have against rent due to the estate.
146 Id. § 237(l)-(2). This section could permit a trustee acting under the authority of
another nation's bankruptcy courts to attempt to reclaim, as an asset of the debtor, source
code that had been escrowed in West Germany.
147 VerglO, § 36(1).
148 Id. § 36(2).
149 Id. § 50(1). In the. case of a divisible contract, the nondebtor party must elect be-
tween withdrawal and pursuing a claim for completed installments under § 36(2). Id.
150 Id. § 50(2).
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or on that of the receiver or a creditor.' 5 ' The restrictions may be
general or directed at specific assets.' 52 These provisions seem to
aim at the prevention of fraud on creditors. They evidence, how-
ever, a policy in favor of close supervision of estate assets, even in
the composition context.
The German bankruptcy statutes lack many of the specific provi-
sions that guide a lawyer in structuring escrow arrangements under
American or, to a lesser extent, English bankruptcy law. Nonethe-
less, German law recognizes as matters of general policy the impor-
tance of collecting and preserving estate assets and the need for
discretion on the part of the receiver in dealing with contractual
obligations.
C. International Recommendations
This limited review of European law indicates that many of the
problems that a lawyer is likely to encounter in an international es-
crow transaction are conceptually similar to those likely to arise in
the United States. For this reason, a prudent first step in structuring
an international arrangement is to search the relevant bodies of
bankruptcy law for provisions analogous to the provisions of the
United States bankruptcy law that deal with executory contracts,
property of the estate, and automatic stays. The relevant bodies of
law will include the bankruptcy codes of the nations where the par-
ties will locate the escrowed property and where the principals are
incorporated or headquartered.
From a drafting perspective, the review of British and West Ger-
man bankruptcy law suggests that the domestic model proposed ear-
lier in the article often may be a useful starting point. At a minimum,
if a draft international agreement appears to ignore the major issues
addressed in the domestic model, the American party should not ac-
cept it without further inquiry. In particular, counsel for American
participants in the transaction should raise the general questions that
arise under American law and be fully satisfied that similar problems
do not exist in the other nations whose bankruptcy laws may apply.
Finally, as the domestic discussion should make apparent, the
likelihood of an arrangement's surviving the licensor's bankruptcy
depends on subtleties and nuances of legal analysis. Predicting this
151 Id. § 58(i).
152 These restrictions may consist of a general prohibition against the sale of any as-
sets or a prohibition directed at specific assets. Id. § 59. A general prohibition is required
to take effect on a specified date, and the terms of the prohibition must be publicly an-
nounced and served on the debtor, the creditors, and the trustee. Id. § 60. Any transfer
made on or after the date of a general prohibition is void against creditors. d. § 62(l)-(2).
A transfer in violation of a specific prohibition is similarly void, assuming that the order
has been served on the debtor and the trustee, and subject to the protection of bona fide
purchasers. Id. § 63(1), (3).
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outcome depends largely on one's ability to predict responses of
bankruptcy courts to particular lines of argument. For this reason,
consultation with local counsel before committing a client to a
course of action is a worthwhile investment.
IV. Conclusion
Software escrow is clearly not a problem that yields a simple and
obvious solution. Therefore, parties should examine with care pro-
posed solutions that claim to be foolproof. Similarly, because the
proper balance in any particular situation may depend on factors
unique to that situation, parties should approach boilerplate solu-
tions with caution. In either a domestic or international transaction,
both parties should be aware of the potential threates to enforce-
ment in bankruptcy and should be sensitive to the need for compro-
mise between the user's desire for certain enforceability and the
proprietor's legitimate intellectual property concerns. The models
proposed here can serve both as an agenda for the discussion of po-
tential problems and as a framework for compromising the often
competing interest of the parties.
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